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I. Introduction 
Mishkin (1999) discussed four monetary policy regimes, 
namely exchange rate targeting, monetary targeting, inflation 
targeting, and finally, “monetary policy with an implicit but not 
an explicit nominal anchor.”  Exchange rate targeting refers to a 
monetary system that ties the domestic currency to some anchor 
currency such as the US dollar.  An example would be the Hong 
Kong dollar since October 17, 1983 and the Argentine peso before 
it broke away from the US dollar link early 2002.  Monetary 
targeting refers to a policy of managing some monetary aggregate 
such as M2 in an attempt to contain its growth within a target 
range.  As Mishkin pointed out, monetary targeting in practice 
rarely followed a rigid rule as Friedman recommended in the 
sixties.  Adherents of this approach include Germany before the 
European monetary union and Switzerland.  Inflation targeting 
is a monetary regime that has gained much popularity in recent 
years.  Pioneered by New Zealand in 1990, it has now been 
espoused by Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, 
Australia, and Spain.  According to Mishkin, Israel and Chile 
have also adopted some form of inflation targeting.  Finally, 
monetary policy in the US under the leadership of Alan 
Greenspan has adopted an eclectic approach.  There is no 
explicit target of any sort.  But the Fed would look at a range of 
macroeconomic indicators in the conduct of monetary policy, 
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while making it clear to the public that containing inflation over 
the long run remains always an overriding concern.  
Of these four approaches, the first three can be said to be 
predominantly “rule-based.”  In contrast, the last approach can 
be said to be predominantly discretionary.1  With no explicit 
constraint, a central bank using this approach can respond to the 
latest developments readily and giving due consideration for the 
need for both full employment and price stability.  The success 
of this policy in the US under the able chairmanship of Alan 
Greenspan, however, has led to worries that should he step down 
there might not be a chairman as skilled as he was.2 
A meaningful discussion about monetary regimes must take 
note of the distinction between means and ends.  In this regard 
Mishkin’s discussion of the pitfalls of monetary targeting is 
particularly telling.  Monetary aggregate targeting would make 
                                                 
1  Some see this eclectic monetary policy as more or less described by the 
Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). See Woodford (2001).  Also see Carlstrom 
and Fuerst (2003) for a more recent assessment. 
2  Consider the following passage from a book review about Alan 
Greenspan.  The reviewer had just referred to the first interest rate cut 
decline in 2 1/2 years, which happened at the peak of the global financial 
crisis in the fall of 1998.  He continued: “Just over a week later, he 
surprised the markets by cutting interest rates again, this time ording a 
reduction on his own instead of waiting for the next meeting of Fed’s 
monetary policy committee.  Investors cheered.  Stock prices zoomed 
higher.  And the crisis passed.  It’s thanks to that sort of astute monetary 
management that the 74 year old Greenspan has achieved the status of an 
economic oracle who holds the fate of the US economy in his hands….” 
(Businessweek, December 18, 2000) 
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sense if there is a “strong and reliable relationship between the 
goal variable (inflation or nominal income) and the targeted 
aggregate,” and if the central bank can effectively control the 
monetary aggregate.  Here monetary targeting is seen to be the 
means, and price stability is seen to be the ends.  But one may 
sensibly ask: why price stability?  Is price stability only the 
means to something more intrinsically desirable?   
It is illuminating to note with Mishkin that “despite the 
rhetoric about pursuing ‘price stability,’ in practice all the 
inflation targeting countries have chosen to target the inflation 
rate rather than the level of prices per se.”  The inflation target 
ranges from 1.5% in the case of New Zealand onward to 2.5% in 
the case of Australia to 8.5% in the case of Israel.  Apparently, 
the variations in the tolerated inflation rates reflect different 
perceived costs in terms of lost GDP or lost jobs that could result 
from pursuing inflation targeting.  Thus, all policy makers in 
practice try to avoid the recessionary impacts of an overly 
aggressive monetary policy aimed at price stability.  Perhaps 
then, inflation targeting is really only a variant of the 
discretionary approach to monetary policy, whose objective after 
all must be to create a favorable macroeconomic environment for 
economic agents in their day-to-day activities.   
Stabilizing the price level should not be an end in itself, as 
changes in the price level may reflect an adjustment that the 
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economy actually needs.  For example, in the face of acute 
shortage such as resulting from a serious drought or an earthquake 
that disrupted economic activities, a jump in the price level3 may 
be needed to encourage economizing on the scarce resources.  It 
is not realistic to assume that any increase in prices in an 
economy will be just offset by decreases in other prices, thus 
maintaining price stability. 
From this perspective, while price stability is desirable the 
main objective of macroeconomic policy is not so much price 
stability per se but sustainable full employment without 
overheating.  In order to do this we need to achieve three 
conditions: (1) aggregate demand at the full employment output 
level, (2) fiscal budget balance at full employment, and (3) 
monetary conditions should be compatible with full employment 
budget balance.   
Section II will lay out the theoretical framework laying out 
the concepts of fiscal conditions index and monetary conditions 
index and the principles behind fiscal and monetary policy 
coordination.  Section III will discuss the macroeconomic policy 
rules under this framework for a bigger economy.  Section IV 
                                                 
3 It may be thought that in this instance only a relative increase in some 
prices would take place, not a rise in the price level.  In practice, however, 
a major supply-side shock, such as the oil crises in the seventies, will raise 
the price level, as a co-ordinated price decline for other goods and services 
cannot be taken for granted. 
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will discuss the macroeconomic policy rules for a smaller 
economy.  Finally Section VI will draw the conclusions from the 
discussion. 
II. Theoretical Framework 
We start with the GDP as income identity: 
GDP ≡ Yd +T-B  
In words, GDP is identically equal to disposable incomes 
plus net taxes minus government interest payment on government 
debt.  When aggregate demand is in equilibrium, income must 
be equal to expenditures, so we have: 
Yd +T-B = C + I + G + X- M 
This is the Keynesian cross condition for aggregate demand 
equilibrium, which can be transposed to obtain:    
T-G-B = I-S-(M-X).   
This says Government Savings (GS) = Private Sector 
Savings Deficiency (PD).   Any fiscal surplus is government 
savings.  Any shortfall of private domestic savings (S) and 
foreigners’ savings (M-X) to meet investment requirements is 
Private Sector Savings Deficiency (GS).  Figure 1 shows how 
the intersection of GS and PD determine the level of equilibrium 
aggregate demand (AD) and the fiscal balance (BB). 
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Figure 1: Determination of Equilibrium Aggregate Demand (AD) and Budget 
Balance (BB) Relative to Full Employment Output 
 
T-G-B, or GS by notation, can be written as a function of 
effective tax rate, lumpsum tax, government expenditures, and the 
GDP Y.  Setting GS = 0, we can write Y as a function g(t, t0, G), 
with the following properties: 
g’1< 0 , g’2 < 0, and g’3 > 0 
g can be called a fiscal conditions index.  When g is equal 
to the full employment GDP, we will have GS* in Figure 2.  
This will be described as the “full employment budget balance 
fiscal conditions line.” Given the tax structure and interest 
payment commitments, there is a unique level of government 
expenditures G that will bring about GS*, which is one in a map 
of “fiscal stance lines.”   
 
Y 
GS= T-G-B 
PD =I-S – (M-X) 
Full employment 
GDP GS, PD 
AD
BB 
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We should note that GS* is not unique because one can have 
higher taxes and higher government expenditures, or smaller taxes 
and smaller government expenditures, while keeping the full 
employment budget balance to 0.  That is, a fiscal policy line 
intersecting the horizontal axis at the full employment level can 
be compatible with a bigger or a smaller government. 
Figure 3 further shows that there is a unique position of the 
I-S-(M-X) line that will bring about a level of aggregate demand 
consistent with full employment.  To see this, let us express the 
private savings gap PD as a function of r, e, Y, t, and t0: 
g<Yf g=Yf
g >Yf 
GS Yf 
Y 
T- G –B 
Figure 2: Relationship between GS lines and Fiscal 
Conditions g 
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PD = I(r,e) – [Y- Y.t - t0 – C(Y – Y.t – t0, W)]  + X(e)– M(r, e) . 
Here consumption is assumed to be a function of disposable 
income and assets W.  Exogenous factors such as the GDP of 
trading partners are left out for simplicity.  Setting PD = 0, we 
can write Y as a function m( r, e, t, t0, W).  Diagramatically, 
setting PD=0 focuses our attention on the horizontal axis.  The 
value of m is the level of Y where a PD line cuts the horizontal 
axis.  m can be described as the monetary conditions index.4  
When m increases monetary conditions are effectively less tight.  
When m decreases monetary conditions tighten.  m* can be 
described as the “full employment–compatible monetary 
conditions”.  It should be noted that the monetary conditions 
index will rise, other things being equal, when interest rate falls or 
the exchange rate depreciates.  But it may also rise or fall 
independently of monetary variables.  If business confidence or 
consumer confidence increases the same monetary variables could 
become overly expansionary, since the former would boost the 
monetary conditions index.  Moreover, fiscal variables such as 
tax rates will also have an impact on the effective monetary 
                                                 
4 The concept of Monetary Conditions Index was originated by the Bank 
of Canada.  According to Freedman (1995) empirically 1 percentage point 
change in interest rates has about the same effect on aggregate demand as 3 
per cent change in the exchange rate.  The MCI is therefore an index 
based on short-term interest rate and the multilateral exchange rate 
movements properly weighted. 
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conditions by shifting PD through its effects on savings and 
investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Policy Rules  
For both big and small economies, the above framework 
indicates that an ideal macroeconomic policy mix would be such 
as depicted in Figure 4.  There is a need to maintain the fiscal 
policy conditions at g* and to maintain the monetary conditions at 
m*.  Once the parameters for the equations g and m are 
estimated, we can compare the actual level of fiscal conditions 
index g with the ideal g* and similarly the actual level of 
monetary conditions index m with the ideal m* and decide if we 
need to expand or tighten policies. 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between PD lines and 
Monetary Conditions m  
Yf 
Y 
PD 
I – S – (M –X)
m <Yf 
m*=Yf m >Yf 
PD* 
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Figure 4: Ideal Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Represented by  
Solid GS* and PD* lines 
 
 
The fiscal policy rule can be described as maintaining full 
employment budget balance.  Monetary policy will generally not 
affect the GS line, except in the longer run through the effects on 
interest payments on government debt. 
Assuming a stable fiscal policy regime, PD may deviate 
from PD* on account of changes in business and consumption 
sentiments, or movements in the effective real exchange rate.  
The monetary policy rule would be to raise or lower interest rates 
to offset these tendencies so as to bring PD back to PD* whenever 
PD deviates from it.   
GS, PD 
Yf 
GS* = T-G-B 
Y 
PD*=I-S+X-M 
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Corresponding to m =Yf or PD = PD* we can draw an M* 
curve in the ( e, r ) space (Figure 5).  M* is one curve in a 
family of “monetary conditions curves” shaped like an 
indifference curve.  The equilibrium exchange rate compatible 
with full employment is determined by imposing the equilibrium 
condition in the foreign exchange market D=S. 
Given M*, suppose there is a capital flight away from the 
country for some reason.  D=S line shifts up.  There will be no 
need to change fiscal policy, and M* has not moved.  But there 
will be a need to reduce the effective exchange rate to e* and to 
raise domestic interest rates from r1 to r*.  Raising interest rates 
excessively to r2 to maintain external balance will lead to an 
unnecessary contraction of the economy resulting in a fiscal 
deficit and unemployment.   
Given the position of M* and assuming that fiscal policy 
provides for full employment budget balance, and assuming that 
maintaining full employment is a priority, the central bank will 
have no alternative under a capital flight scenario (E1 changes to 
E2 in Figure 5) but to allow the currency to depreciate a bit and to 
raise interest rates a bit (point 3 in Figure 5).  The more serious 
the capital flight, the greater will be the depreciation required and 
the higher will be the interest rates required.  But interest rates 
must not be too high as to deviate from M*. 
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IV. Policy Rules for a Small Open Economy 
A small open economy has relatively little capacity on fixing 
its interest rates.  With capital highly mobile small open 
economies normally have to take interest rates as given.  
Floating the exchange rate and adopting discretionary monetary 
policy may lead to unacceptably large fluctuations in exchange 
rates, as market traders speculate on the next monetary policy 
change. 
rd
D=S[E=E2]
D=S[E=E1]
M*
Effective Exchange Rate
Index for Domestic
Currency
r*
e* e1
r2
r1 1
2
3
 
Figure 5: Alternative (e,r) combinations compatible with 
full employment along M* 
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The attraction of a currency board arrangement is that it 
imposes a stricter rule for monetary and fiscal discipline and 
provides greater transparency than most alternative monetary 
arrangements that come to mind.  The drawback of a traditional 
currency board, however, is that it could mean too much 
inflexibility.  If the host currency becomes very strong, life can 
become very difficult as the country will face a loss of 
competitiveness and even deflationary pressures.  Using the 
GS-PD framework above, a traditional currency board would 
mean allowing the PD line to be dictated by the monetary policy 
of the country of the host currency. 
To bring in greater flexibility without compromising 
credibility, we propose substituting the host currency with the 
“world currency unit”—an indexed unit of account 5  that 
represents stable real purchasing power, as discussed in Ho (2000).  
This can be briefly explained as follows. 
Let Qi0 be the GDP of country/zone i in base year 0, 
measured in the domestic currency.  We then define the WCU 
basket as a tiny fraction λ of the basket of GDPs of five major 
market economies with fully convertible currencies:  
1  WCU0 = λ{ Q10 ,Q20 ,Q30 , Q40, Q50 }      [1] 
                                                 
5 See McCallum (2004) and Shiller (1998) for detailed discussions of the 
concept of indexed units of account. 
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The five countries/zones are the United States, the Euro zone, 
Japan, Canada, and Australia.  Together they encompass some 
80 per cent of world total output. 
Valuation of this basket in the base year, V0US$0 , is obtained 
by defining λ such that: 
λ∑ Qi0 . e i0 = US$ 100             [2] 
where  λ is a scaling factor that defines the size of the 
basket and thus the real value of the unit; 
i is any of the five major economies; 
e i0 is the exchange rate converting 1 unit of the currency of i 
into US$ in year 0. 
Valuation over time reflects the forces of exchange rate 
movements as well as domestic inflation/deflation.  Denoting the 
nominal value of one WCU0 at t in US dollarsas V0US$t, we can 
write:  
V0US$t =  λ∑ Qi0 . Pit/Pi0 .e it. 
If Qi0 in current domestic prices increases because of 
inflation, and/or if currency i appreciates against the US dollar, 
other things being equal, the nominal value of the WCU basket in 
US dollars will increase, but still represents the same command 
over real goods. 
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Figure 6 shows the changes in the nominal value of one 
WCU1990US$t, computed using IMF and OECD statistics, from 
1983 to 1999.  A caveat must be added though.  In revaluing 
the WCU basket, we use the consumer price indices of the 
different countries/zones, even though in principle GDP deflators 
would have been more appropriate.  We do this because the GDP 
deflators are usually available only after a relatively long lag.  
Since the WCU is intended to be a unit of account ready to be 
used on a day-to-day basis, for practical reasons CPIs have to be 
used instead of GDP deflators in deriving the current values of the 
unit. 
 
Figure 6: Value of the WCU with base year 1990 in U.S $ 1983-1999 
 
Exchange rate: US$ per WCU (base year: 1990)
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
Q1 83 Q1 85 Q1 87 Q1 89 Q1 91 Q1 93 Q1 95 Q1 97 Q1 99
period
US$
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Whereas under a traditional currency board, such as the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, there is an undertaking to 
convert these Hong Kong dollar notes back to US dollars at the 
same rate, under a WCU-based link, convertibility is guaranteed 
not at a fixed rate against the US dollar, but at a fixed rate in 
terms of real purchasing power (“real money,” not “nominal 
money”).  This means that the US dollar amount into which a 
given amount of the local currency may be converted is variable.  
Indeed, if US dollar buys fewer goods and services, the local 
currency will convert for more US dollars; if US dollars buys 
more goods and services, the local currency will convert for less 
US dollars.  
Specifically, the Monetary Authority may announce at time 
?that α? times V0US$? must be deposited for banks to issue one 
unit of the local currency (called peso here for illustrative 
purposes), until further notice.   Clearly, by adopting a suitable 
α? the local currency can fix the value of the domestic currency 
at any rate in relation to the US dollar, and any traditional 
currency board, such as the Hong Kong dollar6, can, therefore, 
momentarily move onto the WCU link unnoticeably and 
smoothly. 
                                                 
6 One could debate if the Hong Kong dollar is on a “traditional currency 
board” arrangement.  We abstract from this debate and refer to all 
currencies linked to a host currency with 100% backing as “traditional 
currency boards.” 
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- These pesos are then called pesos of vintage?.  The 
monetary authority undertakes that these pesos issued 
are fully convertible into α? times V0US$t at any time t, 
redeemable in US dollars (or any other major currency 
according to prevailing exchange rates).  
- At some time tk in the future, if there is a need to 
devalue, such as arising from a downward shift in PD (in 
which case M* shifts lower), or a capital flight (in which 
case there is a deviation from M* such as described in 
Figure 5), the monetary authority can announce a 
devaluation in the sense of a downward adjustment in α.  
This devaluation will not trigger a panic as existing 
currency holders are protected. 
So we can see that the fiscal policy rule is still to maintain 
GS at GS* and thus to keep fiscal conditions at g*.  The 
monetary policy rule is also to maintain PD at PD*.  The benefit 
of the proposed arrangement is that PD will not be shifted by a 
nominal appreciation or depreciation of the host currency.  When 
there is some structural change that needs to be redressed and a 
real appreciation or depreciation is called for, we can adjust α 
without causing a panic. 
The proposed monetary standard can be called a Real 
Monetary Unit Standard (RMUS).  Transition to a RMUS can be 
made so smooth as to be unnoticeable.  A country on moving to 
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a WCU0 link will determine ? such that ?.Vt = 1 unit of the 
domestic currency.  Thus some?can be found such that 7.8 
Hong Kong dollars continue to exchange for one US dollar 
momentarily after the transition, when 7.8 Hong Kong dollars 
exchange for one US dollar before the transition.   
A further word about sustainability should be added.  It is 
that a currency regime, in order to be sustainable, needs to be 
adaptable and compatible with full employment.  If the currency 
regime produces an exchange rate that is not compatible with full 
employment and has no effective mechanism to adapt towards 
such a rate it cannot be sustainable.  In contrast, the system 
herein proposed allows adaptation towards what is necessary to 
bring about full employment.   
One may well ask if this system is sustainable in the face of 
shattered confidence.  Given the Argentine experience in 
2001-2002 and the Asian experience in 1997-98, it does appear 
that if people firmly believe that the currency will collapse, 
nothing can be done.   If we look at the Thai and the Indonesian 
experience carefully, however, we can only conclude that the 
collapse of confidence was a result of ineffective and misguided 
policies in the first place.  Even in the case of Argentina, high 
interest rates and a lack of the necessary institutions to protect the 
interest of people who have legitimate claims to be protected 
played a key role in the melt down of the economy.   
 20
If we look at the Thai experience, we find first that the 
financial markets actually cheered the initial devaluation of the 
Thai baht.  The Thai stock market jumped noticeably at first.  
But when interest rates were raised sharply higher around the 
region (The Philippine central bank raises the overnight lending 
rate to 24 percent from 15 percent on July 3, 1997) and the 
austerity measures announced on August 5 impressed upon 
investors that the region is headed for a dramatic economic 
slowdown confidence began to crumble.   
Under the proposal of a WCU link, full employment and 
economic stability are the explicit objectives of the central bank, 
and no attempt is made to defend an unrealistically high exchange 
rate.  Interest rates will not be raised to defend the currency and 
will only be raised to cool the economy.   Holders of the 
domestic currency as well as bank deposits know that while the 
currency may devalue, their interests will be protected as the 
vintage of their assets are specified and fully recognized.   The 
valuation of the currency will not be allowed to take on unrealistic 
values in the first place, unlike what may happen under a nominal 
tie to the US dollar.  For all these reasons, and for the reason that 
the WCU itself represents purchasing power over a diversified 
portfolio of multiple currency denominated output, risks for 
holding the local currency and assets of the local currency are 
reduced considerably.  Because perceived risks are smaller, a 
collapse of confidence is less likely.  
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The WCU should be a globally used unit of account in order 
to serve its purpose.   In order that the unit be accepted as a 
standard, it will be necessary for an international organization, 
such as the IMF, to take the lead and to set the standard.   
Clearly there is no reason why the GDPs of other countries cannot 
be added to the basket of GDPs underlying the WCU.  I would 
expect, for example, that China’s GDP may be included some day.   
The key points are that the currencies of the countries represented 
in the basket must be fully convertible and that the countries are 
predominantly free market economies, so that the prices of these 
countries are true market prices.  Once the basket of GDPs are 
chosen, the revaluation of the WCU unit can be taken over by a 
computer using a transparent formula.  It is expected that the 
composition of the basket may need to be updated at some point.  
When this becomes necessary continuity of the series can be 
maintained by reconciling the valuation in the last period under 
the old basket and the valuation in the first period under the new 
basket.   This procedure is routinely done with regard to the 
consumer price index and should be both transparent and 
automatic. 
While the definition of the WCU0 needs to be done with 
authority by an international organization and the revaluation 
automatically updated continuously as data becomes available, 
the monetary policy of countries opting for a WCU0 link should 
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be entirely independent.  Each central bank should choose an 
appropriate α and make appropriate adjustments as necessary.  
V. Dynamics 
It is not the intention of this paper to investigate the dynamic 
properties of this framework, but I need to point out that while the 
framework may be thought to be static in nature, there are 
interesting dynamics involved.   
First is income-expenditure dynamics.  As is well known, 
while the Keynesian cross diagram appears static, the multiplier is 
actually a dynamic process.  Our discussion of GS-PD is only an 
alternative representation of the familiar Keynesian cross 
relationship and requires exactly the same conditions for stability 
in the income-expenditure dynamics, i.e., the marginal propensity 
to spend on domestic goods has to be smaller than unity. 
Second is debt accumulation dynamics.  Debt at the end of 
the year has to be equal to debt at the beginning of the year plus 
any deficit generated during the year.  Thus the time path of 
government debt is governed by the relation: 
(Gt,t+1 + Bt,t+1 – Tt,t+1 ) + Dt = Dt+1 
which can be detailed further by spelling out Bt,t+1 = B(Dt, rh), i.e., 
the interest payment on government debt in the period from t to 
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t+1 is a function of the amount of outstanding debt at time t, and 
the historical interest rates rh at which the debt was issued. 
In the foreign exchange market, we have: 
t
e
∂
∂ = f (X – M, rd – rf) 
which says that the exchange rate change is a function of the 
current account surplus and the difference between domestic and 
foreign interest rates.  f1 and f2 are both positive. 
Finally, it is acknowledged that the discussion thus far has 
ignore price level change dynamics resulting from the interaction 
between aggregate demand and aggregate supply.  If aggregate 
demand exceeds or falls short of aggregate supply, the price level 
may change and this may lead to changes in the foreign exchange 
market as well as secondary effects on both PD and GS.  These 
considerations will complicate the model but will not affect the 
general conclusions about the appropriateness of setting PD at 
PD* and GS at GS* as illustrated in Figure 4. 
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper I have proposed a simple framework that is 
based on the simple Keynesian cross condition for aggregate 
demand determination.  Two measures for macroeconomic 
policies have been derived: a fiscal conditions index and a 
monetary conditions index.  We have proposed an inactive fiscal 
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policy: keeping fiscal conditions at g* and the GS curve at the 
GS* position regardless of the phase of the business cycle, along 
with a more active monetary policy aimed at reestablishing m at 
m* whenever it deviates from it for whatever reasons.  While the 
analytical framework can be said to be Keynesian this policy 
recommendation is certainly not Keynesian.   
While I made a case for keeping monetary conditions at the 
full employment compatible level, in practice this would dictate 
moving both interest rate and exchange rates at times for the 
bigger economies.  For the smaller economies, I propose 
adopting an innovative currency board based on an indexed unit 
of account representing constant purchasing power.  Such a 
currency board is shown to have built-in flexibility compared to 
traditional currency boards.  Our analytical framework indicates 
that even with such built-in flexibility, it is possible that an 
occasional devaluation or revaluation may be necessary.  By 
designating currency issues and bank deposits with a vintage ? 
and guaranteeing convertibility into the basket of constant 
purchasing power at the given rate, it is possible to avoid panic, 
and provide for smooth transition to the necessary monetary 
conditions required for full employment. 
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